Ever since Plato's Republic, a persistent problem and dilemma in Western thought has been the relation of the love of wisdom and political power, especially the role that the intellectual does or ought to play in the world of action. This volume includes both theoretical studies and case studies of modern intellectuals. Most of the articles have been published before but several, including T. Parson's "'The Intellectual': A Social Role Category" and J. Netl's "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent" were (...) written for this volume. Other contributors are Shils, Dahrendorf, Berlin, Bushnell, Samuels, Comte, Nisbet, and Rieff. The most eloquent and moving essay is Isaiah Berlin's sympathetic study of Moses Hess. Through the great diversity of approaches and issues discussed, a common theme emerges--the fragility of the role of the intellectual, who is frequently duped, sometimes subtly corrupted or persecuted, but who, on occasion can shape and humanize the vision of his fellowmen, even though he may appear as the "fool" to his contemporaries. One striking lack here is a "case study" of any representative intellectual of the "New Left," but the total effect of this intelligently chosen collection is to provide us with a needed perspective for assessing the possibilities and dangers open to intellectuals in our time.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Eight articles written by members of the Tulane philosophy department. The contributions range from a discussion of classifications of supposition in medieval logic by Louise Nisbet Roberts and a comparatively lengthy consideration of the relationship between universals and individuals by James K. Feibleman to an attempt by Paul G. Morrison to clarify in a restricted system the expressions, 'invariance,' 'homogeneity,' and 'heterogeneity.'--R. P.

This is at once a fascinating, illuminating, perceptive, and perplexing book. It has many virtues. There are probably few intellectuals in any "discipline" who can write about the sweep of Western civilization with such scope, insight, and perceptiveness. Nisbet has attempted to write a history of a metaphor which has exerted an enormous influence on Western thinking from the Greeks until our time. It is the metaphor of organic development as applied to the understanding of social development. According to (...) Nisbet we find this basic metaphor at the root of Greek thinking about cycles, the Christian idea of epic, and the modern idea of development as progress. The first part subtly sketches the variations on the metaphor of organic growth in The Greeks, The Christians, and The Moderns. This in turn establishes a background for exploring the theory of social development articulated from the eighteenth century to the present. Although Nisbet is modest in his claims about his distinctive contribution to each of these historical chapters, he does bring fresh insight to bear and exposes numerous myths that have cluttered our historical understanding. Given the scope of his treatment, there is plenty that "specialists" may question, although even where one disagrees with his interpretations, one can't help admiring his command of the material. It is the final chapter that leaves one perplexed. For while Nisbet has made an excellent case for showing how deep the metaphor of organic development has been in Western thought, he seems to be genuinely ambivalent about its significance and pragmatic value. Operating in this chapter is a dichotomy between the "literal" and the "metaphoric" that is never fully explicated. Nisbet seems to think that with proper judiciousness, the metaphor can be revealing when applied to large scale units such as "civilization" and "culture," but that it is disastrous and dogmatic when used to account for specific instances of social behavior. The book ends with a rather sharp polemical attack on contemporary functionalists. It would seem that Nisbet set out to trace the variations of the metaphor of organic development in order to show how it still influences contemporary "sophisticated" thinking and to expose the abuses and irrelevance of the metaphor for understanding social behavior, but in the course of his masterful exploration he has succeeded in laying the groundwork for a serious questioning of his own polemical conclusions.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Book review: G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. A. W. Wood, ed., H. B. Nisbet, tr.

Nisbet and Kraggerud make good cases for taking the ninth Epode as a dramatic recreation of the Actium campaign. Horace begins in fearful anticipation; then the crisis comes, first on land and then on sea; Antony turns to flight; and — even though some danger remains, and there is metus as well as joy at the end of the poem — the celebrations can finally begin. On this reading there remains the familiar problem of vv. 17–20: at huc frementes (...) uerterunt bis mille equos Galli canentes Caesarem, hostiliumque nauium portu latent puppes sinistrorsum citae. The first couplet clearly relates to the defection of Amyntas' Galatians, the decisive moment in the fighting on land; the second must describe the crucial battle on sea. There is no problem in portu latent. The fleet has withdrawn, and is skulking in harbour instead of fighting. But what of nauium…puppes sinistrorsum citae? The difficulty is notorious: the secondary sources do not clearly describe any movement ‘toward the left’, and it is hard to see why Horace chooses so enigmatic a phrase to capture the fighting. His audience would not make much of the topographical detail in any case: unless they had been at Actium themselves , their reaction to the words would centre on other associations — the contrast between these magnificent puppes and their undignified sideways movement; the suggestions of ill omen in sinistrorsum. (shrink)